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ESOPS AND
CORPORATE OFFICERS’
COMPENSATION
STOYU I. IVANOV1
SAN JOSÉ STATE UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
In the literature two major hypotheses have been developed for Employee
Stock Ownership Plans used as a takeover defense, the management entrenchment and
shareholder interest hypotheses, with the existing research not finding conclusive
evidence for either one. In this paper we provide evidence that the entrenchment
hypothesis is not supported by finding that Employee Stock Ownership Plan firms pay
less to their managers than non-Employee Stock Ownership Plan firms. If managers
were truly entrenched, they would have been able to expropriate wealth from the
existing shareholders, which appears not to be the case for Employee Stock
Ownership Plan firms.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this study we test the hypothesis of Employee Stock Ownership Plans
(ESOPs) being used to entrench management by examining management
compensation. We study a sample of pooled cross-section and time-series data of
manager compensation in the period 1996-2001 to determine how ESOP presence
affects managerial entrenchment. We find evidence that the entrenchment hypothesis
is not supported by finding that ESOP firms pay less to their managers than nonESOP firms. If managers were truly entrenched, they would have been able to
expropriate wealth from the existing shareholders, which appears not to be the case
for ESOP firms.
The contribution of our study is that we attempt to fill the void in the literature
of managerial compensation by examining ESOP as a form of entrenching managers
and destruction of shareholder value. ESOPs are different from the other blockholder
types because of their legal structure. ESOPs are structured as defined contribution
pension plans that are legally required to hold at least 50% of their investments in the
1
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sponsoring firm’s stock. The pension plan is managed by a management appointed
trustee, who is responsible for voting the unallocated ESOP shares.
II. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
The research in ESOPs has been primarily focused on firm performance
(Borstadt and Zwirlein, 1995) and long run value effects to shareholders. Most of
these studies find evidence that ESOPs are related to firm value (Chaplinsky and
Niehaus, 1994; Pugh, Jahera and Oswald, 1999; Cramton, Mehran and Tracy, 2005 to
name a few). This is not surprising considering the high-profile cases of creation and
destruction of value in firms adopting an ESOP. For example, in 2007 in a highly
publicized acquisition Sam Zell, the real estate magnate, acquired the Tribune
Company by contributing only 4% of the $8.2 billion price of the company, by
designing a deal that involved a tax beneficial ESOP, which preserved current
management (Creswell and Bajaj, 2007). In 2008 Tribune Co. filed for bankruptcy.
In this study we approach the problem of value effects to shareholders by
examining entrenchment of managers. Two alternative hypotheses have been put forth
in the literature with regards to the role of ESOPs as a defensive mechanism: the
management entrenchment hypothesis and the shareholder interest hypothesis (also
known as the convergence of interests hypothesis).
The first hypothesis suggests that managers expropriate wealth from
shareholders after obtaining protection from removal via an entrenchment tool.
Entrenchment occurs when managers adopt policies and act in such a way that their
removal becomes costly to shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The adoption of
antitakeover provisions thus makes the removal of managers costly relative to the
alternative, their retention. Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1994) find that ESOPs are a
strong deterrent to takeover. The predominant view in the literature, as pointed out by
Scholes and Wolfson (1989), is that the takeover defense benefits of ESOPs are the
primary motivating factor for establishing ESOPs relative to their tax benefits,
improvements in employee productivity and costs. Scholes and Wolfson (1989)
suggest that ESOPs can be very costly, considering the share-repurchase obligations
towards departing employees. When employees depart the company must repurchase
their stock. Considering that the company must refinance at this time, strain on the
company finances usually occurs. Additionally, ESOPs can help entrench
management. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) provide evidence for the costs of managerial
entrenchment. They study charter-based and bylaws-based staggered boards and their
impact on market values and find that charter-based staggered boards are negatively
related to market values. Their findings are in support of the hypothesis that
entrenchment is negatively related to firm value. Also, Borokhovich, Brunarski and
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Parrino (1997) find that adoption of antitakover amendments results in managers
obtaining and maintaining above market levels of compensation.
The second hypothesis implies that entrenchment has no negative effects on
shareholder value. This hypothesis is based on the notion that after obtaining the
necessary protection from removal, managers have more time to focus on increasing
shareholder value, compared to managers who spend significant amounts of time
devising strategies to fend off removal and stay in office. Ultimately, the managers are
compensated and retained for performance in terms of maximizing shareholders’
value, Almazan and Suarez (2003) argue that a certain level of entrenchment might be
beneficial to shareholders.
However, there is no conclusive empirical support for either hypothesis in the
literature. The reason for the lack of conclusive support for either hypothesis might be
due to the diverse factors that might affect entrenchment. The presence of a large
shareholder, who is involved in the day-to-day management of the firm, and closely
monitors or works with the CEO (such as a family, who have long term interests in
the performance of the company) might have an impact on the compensation of the
CEO, relative to the compensation of the CEO if such a large shareholder is not
present. Yet, another variation in CEO compensation might occur when there is a
large shareholder who is not actively involved in the management of the company
(such as mutual funds, which predominantly have short term investment objectives).
Additionally, the CEO might be the largest shareholder in the company, in which case
the compensation might be completely different from the situations discussed above.
Recent studies concur with these implications. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find
that occupational pension funds in the UK do not effectively monitor firms that they
are invested in. They find that the pension funds are passive investors that are not
actively involved in the management of the firm contrary to expectations. Core,
Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find that CEO compensation is a decreasing function
of the existence of an external stakeholder with more than 5% ownership and the stake
owned by the CEO. They also find that firms that exhibit internally weaker boards
have greater agency problems, and the CEOs in these firms are compensated
excessively, and perform worse. In a recent article Hartzell and Starks (2003)
empirically show that higher institutional ownership concentration is positively
associated with the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the executives’ compensation
and negatively associated with the level of the executive compensation. Almazan,
Hartzell and Starks (2005) study the relationship between executive compensation and
institutional monitoring, in terms of monitoring costs of the institutions. They
consider potentially active and potentially passive institutions, their concentration and
monitoring costs and find that pay-forperformance of executives is positively related
Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 11, 2010

39

to active institutions concentration and not related to the passive institutions
concentration. In another recent study Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2006) study 13
different types of outside blockholders. They find that the corporate policies in a firm
– investment, financial, operational, and executive compensation – are determined to a
large extent by the type of large shareholder. However, the authors focus on outside
blockholders and ignore managerial, affiliated and ESOP types of insider block
ownership in their analysis. Chang (1990) finds that the adoption of ESOPs supports
both shareholder interest and managerial entrenchment interests hypotheses depending
on whether an ESOP is announced to be implemented for employee compensation or
take-over defense purpose. The reason for the conflicting evidence might be due to the
ambiguity of entrenchment. In general, entrenchment has a negative connotation and
is usually associated with a “bad” manager resisting dismissal by the owners of the
firm. At the same time, however, entrenchment can be beneficial to the owners of the
firm, because a “good” manager will be protected from incurring costs of influencing
the decision makers in terms of potential dismissal and focusing on maximizing
shareholder value instead (Milgrom, 1988).
We contribute to the finance literature by examining ESOP as a form of
entrenching managers and destroying shareholder value. The finance literature has not
conclusively determined whether ESOPs lead to corporate insiders’ entrenchment. We
provide a new perspective on the entrenchment of managers by considering an
influence costs framework (Milgrom, 1988). The influence costs framework allows
for the development of empirical hypotheses of the influence of ESOPs on the
entrenchment of the corporate insiders. The influence costs framework suggests that
by creating the ESOP the management has an owner of the firm that is identifiable
and understandable to management and as such allows management to assess
influence costs more accurately. Of course, this is in relative terms, large blockholders
are easily identifiable but more powerful due to the nature of blockownership, of
course the type of blockholder will matter too.
The preliminary expectations are that the presence of ESOPs enhances the
influence of employees (with the exception of the CEO) and is negatively associated
with managerial (CEO) compensation and sensitivity. In this study the executive
compensation in the firm with a large ESOP block is examined for being different
from the compensation in firms without ESOPs. We focus on ESOP as a proxy for
entrenchment of management and ignore other entrenchment mechanisms.2 Naturally,
the other entrenchment mechanisms might play a role in the determination of CEO
compensation; however, as such they will appear in the error term of our model, and
2
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are thus accounted for when analyzing in isolation the role of ESOP. The preliminary
expectations are based on the idea that the CEO of a firm with a large ESOP block
would be able to establish a preferential treatment in terms of compensation due to
their increased voting power that would affect the compensation negotiation process.
In contrast, in a firm without an ESOP block and thus an increased power of
management the CEO would be compensated more. Naturally, the presence of a large
affiliated or nonaffiliated block holder, with at least 5% block ownership, might
provide an additional variation on the primary hypothesized relationships between
CEO compensation, and ESOP block holdings
Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested based on prior literature:
H0: CEO compensation is unaffected by the presence of ESOPs.
HA: CEO compensation is affected by the presence of ESOPs.
A regression analysis will help test the stated hypotheses. We use the regression to
test for the null hypotheses by studying the relationship of compensation and ESOP
ownership and control for other types of ownership as well, such as percentage
ownership by the firm’s officers and the percentage ownership by outsiders. In this
study we examine only public firms, which besides ESOPs, officers and blockholders
ownership have also dispersed individual investors’ ownership which ensures that the
sum of the percentage ownership of ESOPs, officers and block holders does not add
up to one:

The rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest that managers are
compensated differently in ESOP firms and thus might be expropriating wealth from
shareholders dependent on the sign of the coefficient. If the sign is positive the
managers’ compensation is higher the larger the ESOP block which might indicate
expropriation of wealth. If the sign is negative the manager’s compensation is less the
higher the ESOP holdings and there might be no expropriation of wealth. We control
for size directly in the regression by using sales and return-on-assets because
additional variation of CEO compensation might be due simply to the size of the firm.
We assume no repricing of options and no backdating of options. We also consider
compensation as percentage of the firm’s sales to control for firm size as well directly
in the analysis. The error term of the model, ε, captures any other factors which might
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influence the determination of the executive compensation such as other entrenchment
mechanisms.
III. DATA
Blockholders Database is used to acquire data on blockholders of publicly
traded companies. Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2004) provide a
detailed discussion of the data in the Blockholders Database via Wharton Research
Database Services (WRDS). The blockholders in the database are classified as officer,
director, affiliated entity, ESOPs and outside blockholder. In addition, we use
EXECUCOMP and COMPUSTAT databases to acquire data on executive
compensation and company specific data, respectively.
Executive compensation is comprised of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan
payouts, other annual compensation, options and stock awards. Following the
Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) methodology we use the following three
measures to identify CEO compensation: salary, total compensation for the individual
year (TDC1) and payfor-performance sensitivity (PFPS).
PFPS is calculated as delta times the number of options held, and the option’s
delta is calculated as in Burns and Kedia (2006). They calculate delta based on
BlackScholes option pricing model adjusted for dividend payouts:

where Z is computed based on the stock price S, exercise price X, time to maturity T,
risk free rate r, dividend yield d, and stock price volatility σ2.3 The fiscal year end
stock price S, and the stock price volatility σ2 are obtained from EXECUCOMP (and
is measured over 60 months prior to the fiscal year end of the stock price S). The riskfree rate r is obtained from the Federal Reserve at St. Louis, and the natural logarithm
of the dividend yield d, is from EXECUCOMP, also, and φ, is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function. Burns and Kedia make assumptions about the time
to maturity of the option grant T, and the option exercise price X. The time to maturity
of unvested options is the time to maturity of the most recent options grant minus one
3

Z is computed based on the following equation:
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year, and for vested options as the time to maturity of unvested options minus three
years. The exercise price X is assumed to be the stock price at fiscal year-end minus
the profit per option (where profit per option is calculated as the realizable value per
option from EXECUCOMP divided by the number of options at the fiscal year-end).
Additionally, the authors calculate deltas and option sensitivities for newly granted
options, vested options, and unvested options, which they sum up to obtain total
option sensitivity. Burns and Kedia also calculate convexity of the stock option grants,
and it represents the rate of change of the option’s delta to the stock price, and is as
follows:

where the variables are as defined for the option’s delta, and gamma of options is the
sum of gammas of newly granted, unvested and vested options. Almazan, Hartzell and
Starks use a fourth measure of pay-for-performance sensitivity, which they find to be
significantly correlated with the measure PFPS, because of that we consider only the
three measures discussed above to identify CEO compensation.
IV. ANALYSIS
To examine whether there is a difference between CEO compensation in ESOP
and non-ESOP firms we use three measures of compensation as discussed above and
control for profitability and firm size. A summary list of variables used in the analysis,
with their respective descriptions, is provided in Table 1.
Summary statistics of data used in the analysis are presented in Table 2. We
pool the cross-section of managers’ compensation and time-series for the period 19962001. We end-up with 15,001 usable manager-year compensation observations. For
the calculation of the non-cash compensation, PFPS, we have no data for certain
managers causing the elimination of observations resulting in a sample of 12,301
observations. Naturally, the reader might ask whether the truncation might bias our
analysis. It is possible that small companies might not have complete data. However,
we control for firm size by using sales as a variable in our analysis which will resolve
the small company issue. On the other hand, the selection bias imposed by examining
only available data cannot be avoided and as such is natural limitation of this study.
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TABLE 1
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS4

TABLE 2
SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS ON DEPENDENT VARIABLE

SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

4

PFPS is short for Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity.
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Table 3 provides information about the number of unique firms with ESOP
plans in each year. The number of firms with ESOPs is relatively small compared to
the total sample of firms in the Blockholders database, which is 1500. Considering
that there are companies with incomplete data in the six-year period that we examine
and the fact that there are sometimes more than one blockholder per company the
number of observations in this study is not exactly 1500 companies multiplied by six
years of data. Nevertheless, the number of ESOP firms is comparable to the overall
presence of ESOPs in the economy (Uchitelle, 2007).
TABLE 3
NUMBER OF UNIQUE ESOPS

The correlation among variables plays an important role for the selection of
variables to be used in the analysis. The correlations among variables are generally
low with the exception of sales, which is highly correlated with market value of the
company (results are not reported but are available upon request).5
One might argue that the compensation of managers is highly related to the size
of the company and its particular industry. Larger firms tend to pay higher salaries to
managers. Another consideration is that we analyze pooled cross-section and
timeseries sample, in which inflation, particularly in managers’ salaries might drive
the results. To alleviate these concerns, we also scale the dependent variables by sales.
Therefore, the scaled dependent compensation variables, Salarys, TDC1s and PFPSs,
capture the compensation of the officer relative to the company’s size and eliminate
any problems arising from company size and inflation.
The regression results are presented in Table 4. The dependent variables are
Salary, Salarys, TDC1, TDC1s, PFPS and PFPSs. The results from the multivariate
analysis, from both the nominal and scaled compensation variables, suggest that
managers in firms with ESOPs are paid differently than managers in non-ESOP firms
when salary and bonuses are considered, thus rejecting our null hypothesis.
Considering that the coefficient is negative it is reasonable to infer that the
compensation of CEOs is less in ESOP firms. For example, if we consider the scaled
salary measure of compensation, the marginal relative effect of an increase in ESOP
ownership on manager’s compensation is a negative 0.26. However, when
compensation other than cash is considered ESOP firms seem to have manager
compensation similar to firms that do not have ESOPs, the marginal effects are
5
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negative but statistically insignificant. We also find that firms with outside
blockholders such as families and mutual funds provide lower compensation in terms
of salary and bonuses, and that firms with large holdings by officers provide higher
compensation to the managers. The marginal effects are statistically significant
negative and positive, respectively.6
TABLE 4
REGRESSION RESULTS, WHOLE SAMPLE

Examining the regression results in their statistical significance in isolation if
incomplete, this calls for the interpretation of their economic and financial meaning.
For example, salary is statistically affected by the percentage of ownership by ESOP
plans in their capital structure, with a statistically significant coefficient of -3.06. The
financial interpretation of this coefficient is that the increase in ESOP ownership by
one percentage point is associated with $3060 decrease in the CEO direct
compensation.
When we analyze only firms with ESOP plans, presented in Table 5, we
observe that the combination of ESOP blockholder and outside blockholder results in
a reduction in the managers compensation, which is incompletely offset by manager
blockholders attempts to increase compensation.7
6

Regression results for PFPS and the scaled salary, TDC1 and PFPS measures are not reported
in Table 4 in the interest of brevity because of poor fit; however, the relation between the scaled
dependent variables and independent variables are similar to the non-scaled dependent variables
regression results and are available upon request.
7
Regression results for the scaled salary, TDC1 and PFPS measures are not reported in Table 5
in the interest of brevity because of poor fit; however, the relation between the scaled dependant
variables and independent variables are similar to the non-scaled dependent variables regression
results and are available upon request.
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TABLE 5
REGRESSION RESULTS, ESOP FIRMS ONLY

Contrast these results to the compensation patterns in firms that do not have
ESOP ownership. These results are presented in Table 6. In the firms without ESOP
the manager blockholders have a higher nominal compensation regardless if there are
outside blockholders or not. When scaled compensation is considered, our data
suggests that the presence of large outside owners offset the officer blockholders
higher compensation attempts.8
TABLE 6
REGRESSION RESULTS, NON-ESOP FIRMS ONLY

Chow Test results are presented in Table 7. The Chow Test is designed to
establish whether there is a structural difference in the parameters of two regression
8

Regression results for the scaled salary, TDC1 and PFPS measures are not reported in Table 6
in the interest of brevity because of poor fit; however, the relation between the scaled dependant
variables and independent variables are similar to the non-scaled dependent variables regression
results and are available upon request.
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models. The test has a null hypothesis structural similarity among the coefficients.
Thus our results suggest in an alternative way that the coefficients of the regression
and thus the compensation of managers in terms of salary and TDC1 are different in
ESOP and non-ESOP firms. We do not document a difference in the PFPS
compensation of managers in the two types of firms.
TABLE 7
CHOW TEST RESULTS

V. CONCLUSION
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) can be used as a tax shelter, to
motivate employees, for acquisitions (leveraged ESOPs as in the example of Sam
Zell’s acquisition of Tribune Co.), and to protect the company from take-over. In the
literature two major hypotheses have been developed for ESOPs when they are used
as a takeover defense, the management entrenchment and shareholder interest
hypotheses, with the existing research not finding conclusive evidence for either one.
In this paper we provide evidence that the entrenchment hypotheses are not supported
by finding that ESOP firms pay significantly less to their managers than non-ESOP
firms. If managers were truly entrenched, they would have been able to expropriate
wealth from the existing shareholders, which appears not to be the case for ESOP
controlled firms.
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